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Abstract 
E m p i r i c a l studies have shown that in the U . S . and Japan 
stock m a r k e t s , contrarian investment strategies which 
involve the buying of stocks undervalued b y the m a r k e t , can 
generate higher average returns. This study attempts to test 
w h e t h e r contrarian strategies can help investors to earn 
abnormal returns in the Hong Kong Stock E x c h a n g e . Three 
fundamental variables are used to classify stocks, namely, 
the earnings to market equity ratio, book value to market 
equity ratio and dividend to price ratio. This study 
provides evidence that investors can obtain higher returns 
b y sticking to contrarian strategies. M o r e o v e r , we find that 
contrarian investment strategies do not expose an investor 
to a higher downside risk. Finally, it is found that in the 
sample period, the equity fund industry on average cannot 
beat the m a r k e t . 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
If the capital market is efficient, security prices will 
fully reflect all available information r a p i d l y . The market 
can give an unbiased estimate of the underlying value of the 
s e c u r i t i e s . One important implication of the efficient 
m a r k e t hypothesis is that abnormal return cannot be obtained 
after adjusting for risk. The empirical evidence about 
efficient market hypothesis is m i x e d . While there is some 
evidence supporting the EMH, m a n y scholars still question 
its v a l i d i t y . In particular, some scholars believe that a 
certain kind of contrarian investment strategies (value 
strategies) can generate higher average returns. Value 
strategies involve the buying of stocks that have low price 
relative to earnings, dividends, book values, cash flows or 
other measures of fundamental value. Nicholson (1960, 1968) 
reported that stocks with low price—earning ratios 
consistently outperform stocks with high price—earning 
ratios. McWilliam (1966) and Miller and Widmann (1966) 
conducted similar studies and obtained results parallel with 
the findings of Nicholson. Basu (1975) concluded that the 
price-earning ratios do possess some information content for 
investors. He studied a sample period from April 1957 to 
March 1971 and found that the market's initial response to 
2 
stocks t r a d i n g at d i f f e r e n t p r i c e - e a r n i n g ratios was n e i t h e r 
u n b i a s e d nor a c c u r a t e l y t i m e d . The i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d in 
the P/E ratio is not fully r e f l e c t e d in the m a r k e t p r i c e , as 
s t a t e d b y the efficient m a r k e t h y p o t h e s i s . 
H o w e v e r , these p i o n e e r s ' w o r k did not r e p r e s e n t a direct 
challenge to the efficient m a r k e t h y p o t h e s i s b e c a u s e they 
h a d not i n v e s t i g a t e d the returns of the stocks on a risk-
a d j u s t e d b a s i s . In other w o r d s , if stocks w i t h low P/E are 
f u n d a m e n t a l l y riskier than those with high P/E, it is not 
surprising to observe a higher return on low P/E s t o c k s . 
B a s u (1977) was the first one to test w h e t h e r it is possible 
to b e a t the m a r k e t on a risk-adjusted basis b y using P/E 
ratio to p r e d i c t stock r e t u r n s . He studied the p e r i o d from 
A p r i l 1957 to M a r c h 1971 for the U . S . and found that low P/E 
stock portfolios on average generate a higher risk-adjusted 
returns than the high P/E p o r t f o l i o s . He b e l i e v e d that 
p u b l i c l y available information is not instantaneously 
impounded in security p r i c e s . There are lags and friction in 
the adjustment process and P/E ratios seem to contain some 
information for investors to predict stock returns. 
Reinganum (1981) reported abnormal returns on stocks with 
high earning-to-price ratios. Portfolios formed based on E/P 
ratio experienced average returns systematically different 
from that predicted by the CAPM m o d e l . He suggested that 
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e i t h e r the m a r k e t is inefficient or the C A P M m o d e l is 
m i s s p e c i f i e d . Peavy III and Goodman (1983) further tested 
the v a l i d i t y of the P/E ratio as a p r e d i c t o r of risk-
a d j u s t e d s e c u r i t y r e t u r n s . They c o n t r o l l e d for the p o t e n t i a l 
sources of b i a s such as small firm size, infrequent trading 
and i n d u s t r y e f f e c t . U s i n g q u a r t e r l y returns from 1970 to 
1980, the authors still found a significant r e l a t i o n s h i p 
b e t w e e n security returns and the P/E ratio after controlling 
for the effects m e n t i o n e d a b o v e . Low P/E industry p o r t f o l i o s 
o u t p e r f o r m high P/E counterparts and the industry m e a n , both 
b e f o r e and after adjustment of beta r i s k . Their results 
again suggested that excess returns can be obtained b y 
adhering to a low P/E s t r a t e g y . Jaffe, Keim and W e s t e r f i e l d 
(1989) examined the relation between stock returns and the 
effects of m a r k e t value and earnings-to-price r a t i o . They 
u s e d a rather long sample p e r i o d , 1951-1986, and a dataset 
w h i c h is free of survival b i a s . In addition, they also 
investigate the returns of the firms with negative earnings. 
Over the entire sample period, they found a significant 
positive relationship between stock returns and the 
earnings-to-price ratio. They also reported evidence of 
consistently high returns for firms of all sizes with 
negative earnings. Their findings further confirmed the 
importance of E/P ratio in stock selection. 
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B e s i d e s the p r i c e - e a m i n g ratio, the b o o k - t o - m a r k e t ratio is 
also b e l i e v e d to have some p r e d i c t a b i l i t y on stock r e t u r n s . 
R o s e n b e r g , R e i d and Lanstein (1985) first s u g g e s t e d the 
、、bo〇k-price〃 strategy for selecting s t o c k s . Their database 
includes returns data for 1400 large C o m p u s t a t companies 
from J a n u a r y 1973 to M a r c h 1980. The r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n 
the B/M s t r a t e g y returns and the m a r k e t returns was analyzed 
b y a time series r e g r e s s i o n . In their a n a l y s i s , the B/M 
s t r a t e g y , w h i c h call for the buying of high B/M stocks, beat 
the m a r k e t in 102 out of 141 m o n t h . The average return of 
the B/M strategy was 0.36% higher than the m a r k e t r e t u r n . 
Since the B/M strategy achieved h i g h l y significant results, 
the authors concluded that during that time p e r i o d , the 
actual m a r k e t price in the NYSE was i n e f f i c i e n t . 
Scholars continued to explore other variables that m a y be 
u s e d to p r e d i c t stock returns. The cash flow to price ratio 
is another c a n d i d a t e . M o r e o v e r , empirical studies had 
extended to other stock markets besides the United States. 
Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991) studied the relationship 
between the cross-sectional difference in stock returns and 
different fundamental variables, using data from the Tokyo 
Stock E x c h a n g e . The fundamental variables they employed were 
earnings-to-price ratio, market value, book-to-market ratio 
and cash flow to price ratio. Their dataset extends from 
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1971 to 1988, including b o t h m a n u f a c t u r i n g and non-
m a n u f a c t u r i n g f i r m s . M o s t i m p o r t a n t l y , the i n c l u s i o n of 
d e l i s t e d firms in their dataset m a k e their results free of 
s u r v i v a l b i a s . They found that all four v a r i a b l e s have 
s i g n i f i c a n t p r e d i c t i n g p o w e r on stock r e t u r n s . Their 
findings c o n f i r m e d that the p r e d i c t i n g p o w e r of the 
f u n d a m e n t a l v a r i a b l e s on stock returns is not limited to the 
U . S . stock m a r k e t . 
Fama and French (1992) further tested the v a l i d i t y of the 
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972) capital 
asset p r i c i n g m o d e l . Using data from Compustat for the years 
1962-1989, they tested whether beta can explain the cross-
sectional difference in security r e t u r n s . They exclude the 
pre-1962 Computstat data because those data have serious 
survival b i a s , they are tilted towards big h i s t o r i c a l l y 
successful firms. They found there was no (or only very 
weak) relationship between beta and stock r e t u r n s . On the 
contrary, two variables, namely market value and book-to-
m a r k e t ratio, combined can capture the cross-sectional 
variation in average stock returns. Clearly, their results 
did not support the central prediction of the SLB asset 
pricing m o d e l , that is, the average stock returns are 
p o s i t i v e l y related to market b e t a . However, Fama and French 
did not agree with the claim that contrarian investment 
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s t r a t e g i e s can earn excess r i s k - a d j u s t e d r e t u r n s . They 
a r g u e d that if a s s e t - p r i c i n g is rational and the m a r k e t is 
e f f i c i e n t , m a r k e t value and B/M m u s t p r o x y for r i s k . 
W h i l e there is some consensus that value s t r a t e g y can b e a t 
the m a r k e t b y p r e d i c t i n g cross sectional d i f f e r e n c e s in 
stock r e t u r n s , different explanations for the o b s e r v e d 
p r e d i c t a b i l i t y have been s u g g e s t e d . One e x p l a n a t i o n is that 
the p r e d i c t i v e power of value strategies is an artificial 
result of research design and database d e f i c i e n c y . If a 
d i f f e r e n t m e t h o d o l o g y is employed, this p r e d i c t i v e power m a y 
be reduced or even v a n i s h . H o w e v e r , scholars have looked 
into the issue and concluded that data bias or m e t h o d o l o g y 
p r o b l e m is not a very good explanation for the superior 
p e r f o r m a n c e of value stocks. Davis (1994) used a database 
w h i c h is free of survival bias to examine the p r o b l e m . The 
sample covered the period from July 1940 to June 1963. The 
accounting data was collected from Moody^s Industrial 
Manuals. Since Moody's cannot exclude a firm after it ceased 
to exist, the database is free of survival bias which is a 
potential problem in the Compustat d a t a b a s e . The author 
reported a significant predictive power of book-to-market 
ratio, earnings-to-price ratio and cash-flow to price ratio 
on realized stock returns. So, he concluded that the 
relationship between the fundamental variables and stock 
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r e t u r n s is not an artifact due to sample s e l e c t i o n b i a s . 
C h a n , J e g a d e e s h and L a k o n i s h o k (1995) further i n v e s t i g a t e d 
the s e l e c t i o n bias p r o b l e m . In p a r t i c u l a r , they examine 
w h e t h e r selection bias can explain the return d i f f e r e n c e 
b e t w e e n h i g h b o o k - t o - m a r k e t stocks (value stocks) and low 
b o o k - t o - m a r k e t stocks (glamour s t o c k s ) . They found that the 
s e l e c t i o n b i a s on Compustat is not a severe p r o b l e m . 
M o r e o v e r , they have used stocks from the top quintile of 
N Y S E - A m e x and confirmed the superior p e r f o r m a n c e of value 
s t o c k s . They concluded that the concern about selection bias 
on C o m p u s t a t is p r o b a b l y e x a g g e r a t e d . The p r e d i c t i v e ability 
of the fundamental variables on stock returns should be a 
genuine relationship rather than a data bias a r t i f a c t . 
The second explanation is that the fundamental variables 
that can be used to predict stock returns actually are 
proxies for r i s k . Thus value stocks which earn higher 
average returns should be fundamentally r i s k i e r . The excess 
returns on value stocks are in fact risk p r e m i u m s . Chan 
(1988) argued that the abnormal return to the contrarian 
investment strategy is sensitive to the model u s e d . He 
suggested that the superior performance of contrarian 
strategy is a result of its ability to pick riskier loser 
stocks which suffer larger losses at economic downturns. 
A l t h o u g h a contrarian investors can experience above market 
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a v e r a g e r e t u r n s , the excess return is o n l y a n o r m a l 
c o m p e n s a t i o n for the risk u n d e r t a k e n . Fama and French (1993) 
s u g g e s t e d that the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n m a r k e t v a l u e and B/M 
w a s due to the common factors p r e s e n t in the two p r e d i c t o r 
v a r i a b l e s . They b e l i e v e that assets are p r i c e d r a t i o n a l l y , 
and the v a r i a b l e s related to average returns m u s t p r o x y for 
s e n s i t i v i t y to common risk factors in r e t u r n s . In other 
w o r d s , there are some m i s s i n g risk factors w h i c h are 
r e f l e c t e d in the p r e d i c t o r variables (E/P, B / M , etc.) . If 
these factors can be incorporated into a m u l t i f a c t o r asset 
p r i c i n g m o d e l , then the m o d e l should be able to explain 
cross sectional stock r e t u r n s . H o w e v e r , they have not 
identified such m i s s i n g factors. 
The third possible explanation is that the stock market 
prices are not e f f i c i e n t . Value strategies can earn higher 
returns because they exploit the suboptimal behaviour of 
ordinary investors. If value strategies can produce higher 
average returns without being fundamentally riskier, then 
the m a r k e t is probably not efficient, or we have used a 
w r o n g measurement of risk to compute risk adjusted returns. 
A l t h o u g h some scholars agreed that the market is 
inefficient, their explanation for market inefficiency also 
d i f f e r s . De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) suggested that 
individuals tend to overreact to recent information and 
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u n d e r w e i g h p r i o r d a t a . They e m p l o y e d m o n t h l y data from NYSE 
for the p e r i o d from January 1926 to D e c e m b e r 1982 and 
e x a m i n e d the return p e r f o r m a n c e of the 、、l〇ser" stocks and 
^^winner" s t o c k s , w h i c h w e r e c l a s s i f i e d a c c o r d i n g to their 
r e c e n t p r i c e p e r f o r m a n c e . They found that p o r t f o l i o s of 
p r i o r 、、l〇sers〃 o u t p e r f o r m e d p r i o r 、、winrLers." De B o n d t and 
Thaler gave the following conjecture: Due to the 
o v e r r e a c t i o n of the investors, stock p r i c e s m a y t e m p o r a l l y 
d e p a r t from their true fundamental v a l u e . On the other h a n d , 
A b a r b a n e l l and B e r n a r d (1992) employed earnings, forecasts 
and stock p r i c e data of 178 firms over the p e r i o d 1 9 7 6 - 1 9 8 6 . 
Instead of o v e r r e a c t i o n , they concluded that investors 
actually u n d e r r e a c t to recent e a r n i n g s . 
L a k o n i s h o k , Shleifer and V i s h n y (1994) conducted a more 
complete analysis on contrarian investment s t r a t e g i e s . In 
their study, data in the period A p r i l 1968-April 1990 from 
the Compustat database is employed. Using a m e t h o d o l o g y that 
can m i t i g a t e the survival bias problem, they confirmed the 
superior returns generated from value strategies. In their 
analysis, stocks are classified into glamour-value deciles 
according to several fundamental variables which proxy for 
m a r k e t expectation and past performance of the stocks. The 
accounting multiples which reflects market expectation are 
the earnings to market equity (E/P), book to market equity 
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(B/M), cash flow to p r i c e ratio (C/P). V a l u e stocks are 
d e f i n e d as those stocks w i t h high E / P , B/M and C / P , that is, 
m a r k e t expect them to have p o o r future g r o w t h . Stocks w i t h 
low E / P , B/M and C/P are glamour s t o c k s . On the other h a n d , 
p a s t p e r f o r m a n c e of stocks is p r o x y b y the growth in sales 
(GS) . Stocks w i t h high GS are glamour s t o c k s . Thus, value 
stocks are those have p o o r p e r f o r m a n c e in the p a s t and the 
m a r k e t do not expect them to do well in the f u t u r e . The 
authors r e p o r t e d that no m a t t e r which indicator is u s e d to 
sort stocks, simple value strategies have o u t p e r f o r m e d 
glamour strategies over the A p r i l 1968 to A p r i l 1990 p e r i o d . 
U s i n g c o n v e n t i o n a l risk m e a s u r e m e n t such as CAPM betas and 
standard d e v i a t i o n s , the difference in risk cannot explain 
the m u c h higher average return generated b y value 
s t r a t e g i e s . When p r o c e s s e d n o n - p a r a m e t r i c a l l y , the authors 
also found no evidence to support that value stocks p e r f o r m 
m u c h p o o r e r in economic d o w n t u r n s . In fact, the performance 
of value stocks in economic 、、 down 〃 periods was very 
i m p r e s s i v e . Thus, value strategies appear no riskier than 
glamour strategies. Finally, the authors suggested that 
m a r k e t participants have been extrapolated past performance 
too far. Investors tend to overestimate the future growth 
rate of glamour stocks relative to value stocks. The 
optimistic expectations about glamour stocks were not 
justified by their subsequent performance. 
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In this study, we examine w h e t h e r c o n t r a r i a n i n v e s t m e n t 
s t r a t e g i e s can help investors to generate h i g h e r returns in 
the H o n g K o n g Stock E x c h a n g e (HKSE). In p a r t i c u l a r , we w i l l 
m a i n l y c o n c e n t r a t e on the issue of w h e t h e r value strategies 
w i l l expose the investor to a higher r i s k . B e s i d e s Tokyo 
Stock E x c h a n g e (TSE) , HKSE is the second largest stock 
m a r k e t in the Pacific Basin R e g i o n . C o m p a r e d w i t h the NYSE 
and TSE, HKSE is relatively l e s s - d e v e l o p e d . It is only about 
one h u n d r e d years o l d . Callen, Chan and Cheung p r o v e d that 
Hong K o n g stock m a r k e t is weak form e f f i c i e n t . (1991) 
H o w e v e r , its semi-strong form efficiency has not been 
t e s t e d . M o r e o v e r , there is evidence that contrarian 
investment strategy can work in the Tokyo Stock E x c h a n g e , it 
is interesting to test whether it can also work in the H K S E . 
A l t h o u g h the evidence from the study suggests that the Hong 
Kong stock m a r k e t is probably not efficient, we are not 
going to address the question of why the m a r k e t is not 
efficient h e r e . 
The analysis which will be carried out in the next two 
chapters basically follows the methodology employed in 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994). The stocks in the 
HKSE will be classified into value stocks and glamour stocks 
according to several fundamental v a r i a b l e s . Then the 
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q u a r t e r l y stock return p e r f o r m a n c e of v a l u e and glamour 
p o r t f o l i o s w i l l be analyzed and c o m p a r e d . 
The s e c o n d question we ask is w h e t h e r value p o r t f o l i o s are 
f u n d a m e n t a l l y riskier than glamour p o r t f o l i o s . First, we 
w i l l p r o c e s s n o n - p a r a m e t r i c a l l y to see w h e t h e r the 
p e r f o r m a n c e of value stocks is e s p e c i a l l y p o o r in economic 
、、bad〃 q u a r t e r s . We w i l l also look at some traditional 
m e a s u r e s of risk such as CAPM betas and standard deviations 
of v a l u e and glamour p o r t f o l i o s . Finally, the p e r f o r m a n c e of 
value and glamour portfolios will also be compared using 
d i f f e r e n t composite portfolio m e a s u r e m e n t s . 
B e s i d e s the p r e d i c t i o n of cross-sectional stock returns, we 
w i l l also study the performance of p r o f e s s i o n a l m o n e y 
m a n a g e r s in Hong K o n g . For comparison, we are going to 
examine the performance of the equity fund managers in Hong 
Kong to see whether they can outperform the m a r k e t . The 
study of the equity fund industry in Hong Kong is presented 
in Chapter 4. In that chapter, a more detailed review about 
the studies conducted in this area will be given. Our 
findings in general are parallel to previous studies about 
the m u t u a l fund industry, that is, fund managers on average 
cannot outperform the m a r k e t . 
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On c o n c l u s i o n , the study in this thesis has the following 
o b j e c t i v e s : 
1. To e x p l o r e the cross sectional p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of stock 
r e t u r n s in H o n g Kong using some fundamental v a r i a b l e s 
such as p r i c e earnings ratio, b o o k to m a r k e t value ratio 
and d i v i d e n d to price r a t i o . The choice of v a r i a b l e s is 
m o t i v a t e d b y existing evidence in the U . S . and Japan 
stock m a r k e t . 
2 . To examine the risk characteristics of value s t o c k s . In 
p a r t i c u l a r , we want to see if value stocks are 
f u n d a m e n t a l l y riskier than glamour s t o c k s . 
3 . To look at the performance of the equity fund industry in 
Hong K o n g . We will also compare the p e r f o r m a n c e of the 
fund m a n a g e r s with our simple value s t r a t e g i e s . 
It should be kept in m i n d that we are testing a joint 
hypothesis involving market efficiency and the asset pricing 
m o d e l that provide the measure of risk in the test. A n y 
correlation observed between fundamental variables observed 
could be a result of market inefficiencies, or because the 
m e a s u r e of risk is faulty. The joint hypothesis nature of 
the problem prevents an unambiguous solution of whether the 
p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of equity returns is a result of market 
inefficiency or n o t . However, the study of such 
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p r e d i c t a b i l i t y w i l l still be u s e f u l . It can help investors 
in m a k i n g financial investment d e c i s i o n s and u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
of the b e h a v i o u r of stock p r i c e s m o v e m e n t . M o s t i m p o r t a n t l y , 
e v i d e n c e from the H o n g Kong Stock E x c h a n g e can help to shed 
further light on w h e t h e r the results o b t a i n e d in other stock 
m a r k e t s are robust to time p e r i o d and sample c o m p o s i t i o n . 
C h a p t e r 2 describes the data source and m e t h o d o l o g y of the 
s t u d y . The p e r f o r m a n c e of our value strategies in HKSE is 
also p r e s e n t e d . Chapter 3 examines the w h e t h e r value 
p o r t f o l i o s are fundamentally riskier when compared with 
glamour p o r t f o l i o s . Chapter 4 studies the p e r f o r m a n c e of the 
equity fund m a n a g e r in Hong K o n g . In p a r t i c u l a r , the 
p e r f o r m a n c e of the fund managers will also be compared with 
the p e r f o r m a n c e of our value strategies. Finally, Chapter 5 
gives a summary of the findings and interpretation of the 
r e s u l t s . 
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Chapter 2: Simple Value Vs Glamour Strategy 
Methodology: 
The sample period covered in this study is from M a r c h 1980 
to December 1992. The universe of stocks is all listed 
companies in the Hong Kong Stock E x c h a n g e . The accounting 
and returns data of the stocks are taken from the Pacific-
Basin Capital Markets (PACAP) Databases. 
In the study, three accounting multiples are used to 
classify individual stocks into p o r t f o l i o s . They are the 
earnings to market-equity ratio, book-value to market-equity 
ratio and dividends to price ratio. We assume the investors 
hold a quarterly buy-and-hold strategy. In previous studies, 
m o n t h l y , quarterly and annual data were employed b y 
different authors. In this study, we want to examine whether 
an ordinary investor can use value strategies to generate 
higher average returns than the m a r k e t . Since ordinary 
investors cannot afford to follow the market movement as 
closely as the investment professionals, a monthly buy-and-
hold will involve too frequent trading for them. Another 
reason for using quarterly buy-and-hold is that it can make 
the effect of transaction cost smaller. In the case of 
monthly buy-and-hold, trading is too frequent and the impact 
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of t r a n s a c t i o n cost on the actual r e a l i z e d return w i l l be 
v e r y l a r g e . Since we w a n t to capture a r e l a t i v e l y longer run 
e f f e c t , a q u a r t e r l y b u y - a n d - h o l d p e r i o d is m o r e r e a l i s t i c 
and the returns computed are close to w h a t a typical 
i n v e s t o r a c t u a l l y can c a p t u r e . On the other h a n d , an annual 
b u y - a n d - h o l d w i l l result in too little trading and w i l l 
cause too m u c h information l o s s . M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , our 
d a t a b a s e o n l y cover the p e r i o d from 1980 to 1992, the sample 
p e r i o d is too short for us to employ annual b u y - a n d - h o l d . To 
strike a b a l a n c e , we have chosen quarterly b u y - a n d - h o l d in 
this s t u d y . A c c o u n t i n g data are taken from the Financial 
Statement File of industrial and financial companies in the 
PACAP D a t a b a s e s . Earning of a stock is defined as the after-
tax net income of the company before e x t r a o r d i n a r y items. 
B o o k - v a l u e is the total amount of capital contributed b y 
s h a r e h o l d e r s . Dividend is the dividend payable to the 
shareholders in the fiscal year c o n c e r n e d . The above 
accounting m u l t i p l e s are taken from the data in the previous 
fiscal y e a r . M a r k e t equity is the market capitalization 
(number of shares outstanding times price per share) of the 
company at the portfolio formation d a t e . To construct the 
database, the returns data of the companies at each 
portfolio period is matched with the latest financial 
statement d a t a . We do not consider interim reports because 
of their tentative n a t u r e . 
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In fact, a firm's e a r n i n g s , b o o k - v a l u e and d i v i d e n d s all 
r e f l e c t the fundamental value of the firnu E a r n i n g s and 
d i v i d e n d s indicate the p r o f i t a b i l i t y of a firm, w h i l e book-
v a l u e gives insight to its capital s t r u c t u r e . The three 
a c c o u n t i n g ratios (E/P, B / M , D/P) studied show the 
f u n d a m e n t a l v a l u e of a stock relative to its p r i c e . 
C o n t r a r i a n investors try to p i c k up those stocks w i t h high 
f u n d a m e n t a l values relative to their p r i c e s . In our study, 
stocks w i t h high E / P , B/M and D/P ratios are w h a t contrarian 
investors looking for. They are value s t o c k s . On the other 
h a n d , stocks with low E/P, B/P and D/P ratios m e a n the stock 
p r i c e s are relatively high compared with the fundamental 
v a l u e s . They are glamour stocks and the m a r k e t expect them 
to have high growth rate in the near future. 
We use the E/P strategy as an example to demonstrate the 
p o r t f o l i o formation p r o c e s s . A t the beginning of January, 
A p r i l , July and October in each year, the earnings to 
m a r k e t - e q u i t y ratio (E/P) of all listed stocks with positive 
earnings are computed and ranked. If the earnings data of a 
firm is not available for the previous fiscal year, then we 
will exclude that stock from our p o r t f o l i o s . The universe of 
stocks is classified into five categories according to their 
E/P r a t i o s . The first 20% of stocks which have the lowest 
E/P ratios are glamour stocks. The 20% which have the 
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h i g h e s t E/P ratios are value s t o c k s . Then an e q u a l l y w e i g h e d 
p o r t f o l i o , w i t h each stock r e c e i v i n g the same d o l l a r 
i n v e s t m e n t , is formed for each q u i n t i l e . The q u a r t e r l y 
r e t u r n of the p o r t f o l i o s w i t h cash d i v i d e n d r e i n v e s t e d are 
c o m p u t e d . A t the b e g i n n i n g of each q u a r t e r , the E/P ratios 
of the stocks are computed again and the p o r t f o l i o s are 
r e b a l a n c e d such that all stocks in the p o r t f o l i o get the 
same w e i g h t . In this m a n n e r , the q u a r t e r l y returns of the 
p o r t f o l i o in each category are computed for the p e r i o d M a r c h 
1980 to D e c e m b e r 1992. Similar procedures are repeated for 
the same p e r i o d b y using B/M and D/P as the indicators to 
sort s t o c k s . Stocks with negative or zero earnings, book-
value and dividends are treated s e p a r a t e l y . They are 
c l a s s i f i e d as group 6. It should be noted that earnings, 
b o o k - v a l u e and dividends come only once a year, thus the 
quarter to quarter difference in E/P, B/M and D/P are caused 
b y m o v e m e n t of stock p r i c e s . 
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A Comparison Between the Performance of Value Stocks and 
Glamour Stocks: 
The results of the performance of the strategy which use E/P 
ratio to sort stocks are shown in Table 1. We divide the 
universe of stocks into earnings-to-market categories, where 
earnings are taken from PACAP Databases for the end of the 
p r e v i o u s fiscal year and market value is the market 
capitalization of the stock at portfolio formation time. In 
Table 1, the quarterly return and yearly return for the 
portfolios are p r e s e n t e d . The numbers presented are the 
average across all portfolio formation periods in the 
s a m p l e . The yearly returns are computed by compounding the 
quarterly returns assuming a quarterly b u y - a n d - h o l d . The 
results we obtained agree with the findings from previous 
studies using the United States and Japan stock exchange 
markets data. Average over all portfolio formation periods, 
stocks with high E/P (value stocks) have an average 
quarterly return of 13.54¾, while the low E/P stocks 
(glamour stocks) have an average quarterly return of only 
6.39%. The return difference is 7.15% per quarter on 
average. If the E/P strategy is continued with quarterly 
rebalancing of the portfolios, the value stock portfolios 
have an average annual return of 63.71%, which is 
significantly larger than the 25.36% average annual return 
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on g l a m o u r stock p o r t f o l i o s . In the study p e r i o d , the 
a v e r a g e q u a r t e r l y and annual return of the value w e i g h e d 
m a r k e t p o r t f o l i o is 6.46% and 25.46% r e s p e c t i v e l y . Thus, 
v a l u e stocks s i g n i f i c a n t l y o u t p e r f o r m glamour stocks and the 
m a r k e t . In a d d i t i o n , the average q u a r t e r l y and annual return 
of g l a m o u r stocks are almost the same w i t h the m a r k e t 
p o r t f o l i o , it suggests that glamour stocks m a y be those 
stocks w i t h v e r y large m a r k e t c a p i t a l i z a t i o n and w e i g h e d 
m o s t h e a v i l y in the m a r k e t p o r t f o l i o . It is interesting to 
n o t e that stocks w i t h negative E/P have an average q u a r t e r l y 
and annual return of 7.10% and 31.57% r e s p e c t i v e l y . In other 
w o r d s , stocks with negative E/P also have superior 
p e r f o r m a n c e compared with glamour stocks and the m a r k e t . If 
we examine the quarterly returns closely, we can see that 
the average quarterly returns increase in order from Group 1 
to Group 5 . The results confirmed the p r e d i c t i n g power of 
the earnings to m a r k e t - e q u i t y ratio on the cross-sectional 
difference in stock price returns in the p e r i o d 1980-1992. 
N e x t , we look at the predicting power of the book value to 
m a r k e t equity ratio 〇n stock returns. Table 2 presents the 
results of the B/M strategy. Similarly, stocks with high B/M 
are value stocks and stocks with low B/M are glamour stocks. 
In the sample period, the highest B/M group has an average 
quarterly return of 12.96%. The lowest B/M group has an 
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a v e r a g e q u a r t e r l y return of 6.19¾. The average c u m u l a t i v e 
a n n u a l r e t u r n of the value p o r t f o l i o is 5 8 . 9 9 % , c o m p a r e d 
w i t h that of glamour p o r t f o l i o s , w h i c h is o n l y 2 4 . 9 3 % . 
M o r e o v e r , the average q u a r t e r l y returns also increase in 
order as we m o v e from Group 1 to Group 5. A l t h o u g h the 
return d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n value stocks and glamour stocks 
for the B/M strategy is smaller than that in the E/P 
s t r a t e g y , v a l u e stocks still beat glamour stocks and the 
m a r k e t b y a large m a r g i n . Since there are few stocks with 
n e g a t i v e or zero b o o k - v a l u e , we can h a r d l y form a r e a s o n a b l y 
d i v e r s i f i e d p o r t f o l i o with negative B/M s t o c k s . We cannot 
compute the return performance of the p o r t f o l i o s with 
n e g a t i v e or zero b o o k - v a l u e . 
Finally, we examine the performance of the third accounting 
m u l t i p l e , the dividends to price ratio (or dividend yield, 
D/P) . Table 3 presents our results for the D/P strategy. 
V a l u e stocks with the highest D/P ratio have an average 
quarterly return of 11.63¾. Glamour stocks with the lowest 
D/P ratios have an average quarterly return of 8.37%. The 
average annual return of value and glamour stocks are 53.43% 
and 35.12% respectively. Although the return difference 
generated b y D/P strategy is smaller than the return 
difference generated by E/P or B/M strategies, value stocks 
classified by D/P still significantly outperform glamour 
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s t o c k s . M o r e o v e r , the p o r t f o l i o of stocks w i t h zero D/P has 
an a v e r a g e q u a r t e r l y return of 9.68% and an average annual 
r e t u r n of 4 0 . 1 8 % . Thus stocks w i t h zero d i v i d e n d y i e l d also 
o u t p e r f o r m the m a r k e t . 
We h a v e seen that all the three c l a s s i f i c a t i o n schemes we 
u s e d can p r e d i c t the cross section p r i c e returns on stocks 
to some e x t e n t . A m o n g the three accounting m u l t i p l e s , the 
p e r f o r m a n c e of the E/P ratio is m o s t i m p r e s s i v e . Below we 
c o n j e c t u r e some reasons for the difference in p e r f o r m a n c e of 
the three v a r i a b l e s . First we consider the B/M r a t i o . In 
fact, a number of factors can be reflected in the B/M r a t i o . 
If the m a r k e t is efficient, a firm with a low B/M should 
have an attractive growth potential which is not indicated 
in its b o o k - v a l u e but is reflected in the m a r k e t p r i c e . A 
low B/M m a y also describe a company with a lot of intangible 
assets, such as those high technology business with huge 
research and development capital. A natural resource company 
m a y also have low B / M . Of course, a low B/M m a y also 
indicate that the firm is overvalued by the m a r k e t , i.e., a 
glamour stock which we want to sort o u t . Thus, the B/M ratio 
is not a perfect variable for us to distinguish between 
value stocks and glamour stocks. Some stocks that we 
classify as a glamour stock using B/M ratio m a y not be 
overvalued b y the market at all. 
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A l s o , the p e r f o r m a n c e of the D/P strategy is not as good as 
the E/P s t r a t e g y . The w e a k n e s s of the D/P ratio m a i n l y lies 
in its v o l a t i l i t y . The d i v i d e n d p a y a b l e to the shareholders 
is a f f e c t e d b y the m a n a g e m e n t ' s p u r s u i t . Sometimes a firm 
w i t h good earnings m a y only distribute a small amount of 
d i v i d e n d b e c a u s e the m a n a g e m e n t w a n t s to reserve the 
e a r n i n g s for future i n v e s t m e n t . If this h a p p e n s , a value 
stock (with good earnings) m a y be m i s t a k e n as a glamour 
stock if we use the D/P classification s c h e m e . On the other 
h a n d , if the m a n a g e m e n t wants to regain the confidence of 
the s h a r e h o l d e r s , they m a y declare a large d i v i d e n d even the 
firm has only poor e a r n i n g s . They just p r e t e n d to be 
o p t i m i s t i c about the future earnings of the firm. In this 
m a n n e r , the stock of a firm with poor earnings will be 
treated as a value stock. 
C o m p a r e d with D/P and B/M, E/P performs significantly 
b e t t e r . The earnings of a firm is only affected b y its 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y . A s an indicator for the fundamental value, 
E/P is m u c h ''cleaner" than B / M . M o r e o v e r , it does not suffer 
from the same problem as the D/P ratio. It is less affected 
b y the attitude of the m a n a g e m e n t . As a result, the E/P 
ratio can truly reflect the profitability and fundamental 
value of a firm. It is not surprising that using E/P ratio 
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to sort out v a l u e stocks can generate m u c h h i g h e r average 
r e t u r n s . 
In this s e c t i o n , we have confirmed the p r e d i c t i n g p o w e r of 
E / P , B/M and D/P on the cross section stock p r i c e r e t u r n s . 
Simple v a l u e strategies b a s e d on the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of 
stocks b y a single fundamental variable p r o d u c e i m p r e s s i v e l y 
large returns over the p e r i o d M a r c h 1980 to D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 2 . 
S l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t from other studies, our strategies 
involve a q u a r t e r l y b u y - a n d - h o l d periods w h i c h we think is 
m o r e r e a l i s t i c to ordinary i n v e s t o r s . In the next chapter, 
we are going to examine the risk characteristics of the 
v a l u e s t r a t e g i e s . 
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Comments On the Methodology: 
The study in this paper basically follows the m e t h o d o l o g y 
employed in Lakonishok, Shleifer and V i s h n y (1994)• However, 
there are several differences between the t w o . First, 
Lakonishok used data from 1963 to 1990. They had a much 
longer time horizon and they employed annual return d a t a . 
They assumed an annual buy-and-hold strategy while we 
assumed a quarterly buy and h o l d . The number of stocks in 
the NYSE is also much larger than that in H K S E . Second, 
Lakonishok et. a l . used four accounting variables to sort 
stocks. Besides B/M and E/P, he also uses the cash-flow to 
price ratio and the growth of sales to sort stocks. However, 
since cash flow data are not available in the PACAP 
Databases and there are too many missing values in the sales 
data, both cash flows and growth of sales cannot be employed 
h e r e . 
Another difference lies on the treatment of missing returns 
data. In Lakoniskok's study, if the return of a stock is not 
available after portfolio formation, its return is replaced 
with the return on the corresponding size decile. In other 
word, the missing return data of that stock are approximated 
b y the return of stocks with similar size. In our analysis, 
we eliminated the stocks from our portfolio formation if 
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t h e i r r e t u r n s data are not a v a i l a b l e . The reason for a stock 
to h a v e a m i s s i n g return data is m a i n l y due to its lack of 
t r a d i n g . If there is no t r a d i n g , then stock p r i c e is not 
a v a i l a b l e and stock return cannot be o b t a i n e d . In other 
w o r d s , w e h a v e e l i m i n a t e d those stocks w i t h little trade and 
v e r y low l i q u i d i t y . A l t h o u g h this treatment excludes some 
stocks from our sample, it is reasonable to assume that 
investors in general avoid stocks w i t h low l i q u i d i t y . Given 
the s u b s t a n t i a l excess return on value p o r t f o l i o s over 
glamour p o r t f o l i o s , the p o t e n t i a l bias that m a y arise from 
this t r e a t m e n t w i l l not affect our conclusion in qualitative 
t e r m s . 
A s we have m e n t i o n e d , different b u y - a n d - h o l d periods have 
b e e n u s e d b y different authors in previous s t u d i e s . In this 
study, we have p r o v e d that using quarterly b u y and hold, 
even an ordinary investor can earn excess returns b y 
sticking to simple value strategies. We cannot exclude the 
p o s s i b i l i t y that the magnitude of the excess return on value 
strategies m a y be sensitive to the choice of the length of 
b u y - a n d - h o l d p e r i o d . However, we are not going to find out 
the optimal length of holding period in this study. It m a y 
be an interesting question for future research work to 
compare the performance of value strategies using different 
b u y - a n d - h o l d periods and find out the most profitable o n e . 
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Chapter 3: Are Value Strategies Fundamentally Riskier ？ 
In the last chapter, we have shown that value strategies, 
w h i c h involve the buying of stocks undervalued b y the 
m a r k e t , can beat the market and produce a m u c h higher return 
on a v e r a g e . In fact, previous studies of the U . S . and Japan 
stock m a r k e t s have come up with some consensus that value 
strategies can outperform the m a r k e t . However, the reasons 
w h y they can do so is more controversial. Some scholars 
b e l i e v e d that value strategies can produce higher returns 
because the market is not efficient and value strategies can 
exploit the suboptimal behavior of ordinary investors. The 
risk-based explanation, which is argued most forcefully by 
Fama and French, states that value strategies can produce 
higher returns because they are fundamentally riskier. In 
this chapter, we will test whether value portfolios are 
fundamentally riskier when compared with glamour portfolios. 
In fact, there is no widely accepted definition of risk. 
Before we study the conventional measures of risk, we 
proceed non-parametrically to examine the performance of 
value stocks relative to glamour stocks in our sample 
p e r i o d . Table 4 presents the quarter-by-quarter performance 
of value stocks relative to glamour stocks. The numbers 
presented are the quarterly return differences between value 
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stocks (Group 1) and glamour stocks (Group 5) • The results 
of all three strategies are s h o w n . A p o s i t i v e n u m b e r m e a n s 
that v a l u e stocks o u t p e r f o r m glamour stocks in that q u a r t e r . 
A n e g a t i v e n u m b e r indicates the o p p o s i t e . The results are 
also s u m m a r i z e d in Figure 1 - Figure 3 . 
For the E/P s t r a t e g y , value stocks o u t p e r f o r m glamour stocks 
in 40 out of 51 quarters in the p e r i o d s t u d i e d . In fact, 
v a l u e stocks b e a t the m a r k e t in 35 out of 51 q u a r t e r s . If we 
use B/M ratio to sort stocks, value p o r t f o l i o o u t p e r f o r m 
glamour p o r t f o l i o in 37 out of 51 q u a r t e r s . Finally, value 
stocks give a higher return than glamour stocks in 36 out of 
51 quarters if we use D/P to classify s t o c k s . 
O b v i o u s l y , the numbers presented do not support the risk-
b a s e d explanation for the higher returns on value stocks. 
For all three classification schemes (especially the E/P 
strategy), value stocks consistently outperform glamour 
stocks and the m a r k e t . In fact, value stocks only 
u n d e r p e r f o r m glamour stocks in a few instances. For the 
risk-based m o d e l to be a valid explanation of the higher 
returns on value stocks, the few poor performance of value 
stocks should occur in bad states of the economy in which 
the m a r g i n a l utility of wealth is very h i g h . In other words, 
value stocks should have much poorer performance in extreme 
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b a d times if we have to say that value stocks are r i s k i e r 
than g l a m o u r s t o c k s . 
N o w , w e are going to p r o c e e d n o n - p a r a m e t r i c a l l y to examine 
the p e r f o r m a n c e of value stocks relative to glamour stocks 
in e x t r e m e b a d times of the e c o n o m y . Firstly, we compare the 
p e r f o r m a n c e of value and glamour stocks in the w o r s t 
q u a r t e r s w h e r e the real GDP growth are e x t r e m e l y l o w . Since 
there is a significant seasonality in the time series of 
q u a r t e r l y real GDP, we are not going to compute the GDP 
growth b e t w e e n consecutive q u a r t e r s . To overcome the 
p r o b l e m , we calculate the year-on-year (YOY) GDP growth rate 
for each q u a r t e r . The Y〇Y GDP growth is the percentage 
growth of the quarter compared with the same quarter in the 
p r e v i o u s y e a r . Let's take the E/P strategy as an e x a m p l e . In 
our sample, the 51 quarters are classified into three states 
according to the Y〇Y GDP growth. The three states are 
average, good and bad quarters. First we compute the mean 
and standard deviation of Y〇Y GDP growth in the sample 
p e r i o d . In our definition, an average quarter is a quarter 
w i t h a Y〇Y GDP growth rate lies within one standard 
deviation above or below the mean Y〇Y GDP growth. Bad 
quarters are the quarters with GDP growth more than one 
standard deviation lower than the mean GDP growth. Good 
quarters are those with GDP growth higher than the mean GDP 
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g r o w t h b y m o r e than one standard d e v i a t i o n . In the sample 
p e r i o d , there are 9 b a d q u a r t e r s , 32 average quarters and 10 
g o o d q u a r t e r s in terms of Y〇Y GDP g r o w t h . If we use E/P 
ratio to sort stocks, value p o r t f o l i o s o u t p e r f o r m glamour 
p o r t f o l i o s in 8 out of the 9 b a d q u a r t e r s . In the b a d 
q u a r t e r w h i c h value stocks u n d e r p e r f o r m glamour stocks, 
v a l u e stocks only u n d e r p e r f o r m glamour stock b y 2 % . Table 5 
p r e s e n t s the p e r f o r m a n c e of the glamour and value p o r t f o l i o s 
in d i f f e r e n t states of the economy according to GDP g r o w t h . 
The d i f f e r e n c e in average returns b e t w e e n value and glamour 
stocks in each states is also reported with the t - s t a t i s t i c s 
for the null hypothesis that the difference of returns is 
equal to z e r o . The result of the comparison is obvious from 
the t a b l e . U s i n g all the three classification schemes, value 
stocks on average perform better than glamour stocks in the 
9 b a d q u a r t e r s . For example, using the E/P classification, 
value stocks on average gained 14.43% of its value, whereas 
glamour stocks gained only 7.09%. It is clear that value 
stocks did better when the whole economy is d o w n . Similarly, 
for all three strategies, value stocks outperform glamour 
stocks in the average quarters of the economy. Refer to the 
E/P classification again, value stocks gained 7.92% of its 
value in the average quarters while glamour stocks only 
gained 2 . 5 9 % . It should be noted that in the 10 good 
quarters, the average returns of the value portfolios are 
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s u b s t a n t i a l l y h i g h e r than the returns of the glamour 
p o r t f o l i o s , no m a t t e r w h i c h c l a s s i f i c a t i o n scheme is u s e d . 
T h u s , we have shown that value stocks o u t p e r f o r m glamour 
stocks in all states of the economy and the p e r f o r m a n c e of 
v a l u e s t r a t e g i e s is e s p e c i a l l y p r o m i s i n g in the good and b a d 
q u a r t e r s . We cannot see any evidence that suggests value 
s t r a t e g i e s expose investors to a higher downside r i s k . 
In the second a p p r o a c h , we compare the p e r f o r m a n c e of value 
stocks and glamour stocks in the different states of the 
e c o n o m y according to the performance of the stock m a r k e t as 
a w h o l e . S i m i l a r l y , the 51 quarters in the sample p e r i o d are 
c l a s s i f i e d into good, average and b a d states in terms of the 
p e r f o r m a n c e of the whole stock m a r k e t . There are 9 bad 
q u a r t e r s , 34 average quarters and 8 good quarters in the 
w h o l e sample p e r i o d . For the E/P strategy, value stocks 
generate higher average returns than glamour stocks in 8 out 
of the 9 b a d q u a r t e r s . Value stocks only underperform 
glamour stocks by 1% in one of the quarters. We are going to 
examine the average performance of value portfolios in 
different states of the w o r l d . Similar to Table 5, Table 6 
shows the performance of value stocks relative to glamour 
stocks in three different states of the economy classified 
b y the performance of the stock market as a w h o l e . 
B a s i c a l l y , the results in Table 6 parallel those in Table 5. 
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For b o t h the E/P and B/M s t r a t e g i e s , v a l u e s t r a t e g i e s on 
average o u t p e r f o r m glamour strategies in all three states of 
the w o r l d . For e x a m p l e , if we sort stocks b y E/P r a t i o s , 
v a l u e stocks o u t p e r f o r m glamour stocks in all s t a t e s . 
M o r e o v e r , value stocks generate a m u c h h i g h e r average 
returns in the good and b a d states of the stock m a r k e t as a 
w h o l e . For the D/P strategy, value stocks b e a t glamour 
stocks in the b a d and average s t a t e s . It only slightly 
u n d e r p e r f o r m glamour stocks in the good s t a t e . From the 
results in Table 5 and Table 6, we can conclude that value 
stocks in general lose less in extreme b a d times and gain 
m o r e in good q u a r t e r s . Thus, value stocks have higher up-
m a r k e t betas and lower down-market betas when compared with 
glamour s t o c k s . Besides its excellent p e r f o r m a n c e in good 
times, value stocks also did very well in extreme b a d t i m e s . 
Since poor performance in extreme bad times is always the 
last defense for those who claim that value strategies must 
be riskier, our results clearly reject the risk-based 
explanation for the abnormal returns of value stocks. 
M o r e o v e r , we have computed some traditional measures of risk 
for the glamour and value portfolios for all three 
classification schemes. Table 7 presents the standard 
deviations (a), coefficients of variation (CV) and the CAPM 
betas of the portfolios. For each portfolio, we have 51 
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o b s e r v a t i o n s of q u a r t e r l y r e t u r n s , hence we can c a l c u l a t e 
their s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n s and coefficients of v a r i a t i o n . We 
also h a v e the c o r r e s p o n d i n g returns of the v a l u e w e i g h e d 
m a r k e t p o r t f o l i o , so we can compute a beta for each 
p o r t f o l i o . A s s u m i n g the CAPM equation is v a l i d , we can 
compute beta from directly from the d e f i n i t i o n in the CAPM 
m o d e l , that is C O V ( X , M ) / V A R ( M ) . 
From Table 1, we can see that value p o r t f o l i o s have a 
somewhat h i g h e r standard deviation than glamour stocks for 
the E/P and B/M classification schemes, but the differences 
are not v e r y l a r g e . Using E/P to sort stocks, the average 
standard deviation of value stocks is 24.85% compared with 
the 21.81% of glamour stocks. In fact, the higher standard 
deviation of value stocks returns m a y be due to its higher 
m e a n . A s we can see, the coefficients of variation of value 
stocks are close to that of glamour stocks. A m a z i n g l y , if we 
use D/P ratios for stocks classification, the standard 
deviation of value stocks returns is even smaller than 
glamour stocks, not to mention the coefficients of 
v a r i a t i o n . In conclusion, no matter which classification 
scheme we use, the reward-to-risk ratios for value stocks 
are much higher than glamour stocks. 
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Table 7 also shows that value p o r t f o l i o s have a larger b e t a 
w h e n c o m p a r e d w i t h glamour p o r t f o l i o s . A s we have seen 
e a r l i e r , this larger beta is p r o b a b l y the result of its h i g h 
、、up-niarket〃 b e t a s . In the sample p e r i o d , the average risk 
free interest rate, w h i c h is taken as the interest rate of 
3 - m o n t h time d e p o s i t , is 7.48% per annum, that is about 
1.87% p e r q u a r t e r . The m e a n quarterly return of the value 
w e i g h e d m a r k e t p o r t f o l i o is 6.46%. For the E/P s t r a t e g y , the 
d i f f e r e n c e in beta b e t w e e n value and glamour p o r t f o l i o s is 
0 . 0 6 6 3 . A c c o r d i n g to the CAPM m o d e l , this small difference 
in beta can only account for a quarterly return difference 
of about 0.3%. This is much smaller than the 7% quarterly 
return difference that we find. Clearly, a risk m o d e l b a s e d 
on the difference in standard deviation and CAPM beta cannot 
explain the m u c h higher average return of value s t o c k s . 
There is another asset pricing model called consumption 
C A P M . Grossman and Shiller (1982) showed that cross-
sectional differences in mean asset returns can be explained 
by the cross-sectional differences in the riskiness of the 
assets where risk is measured by the covariability of the 
return with rate of change in aggregate consumption. In 
other words, the model stated that the difference in mean 
returns of the two portfolios is proportional to the 
covariance between the difference in the two returns and the 
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c o n s u m p t i o n growth r a t e . The p r o p o r t i o n a l c o n s t a n t is the 
c o e f f i c i e n t of risk aversion of the i n v e s t o r . We are going 
to compute the covariance and see how large a risk a v e r s i o n 
is r e q u i r e d to explain the return d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n value 
and glamour p o r t f o l i o s . In our c o m p u t a t i o n , the c o n s u m p t i o n 
data are the d e s e a s o n a l i z e d , c o n s t a n t - d o l l a r e x p e n d i t u r e s on 
n o n - d u r a b l e s and s e r v i c e s . For the E/P s t r a t e g y , the 
covariance is 0 . 0 0 0 8 2 8 . Given the difference in m e a n returns 
b e t w e e n value and glamour portfolios is 0.0715, a risk 
aversion coefficient of about 86 is n e e d e d to explain such 
return d i f f e r e n c e . Since a risk aversion coefficient of m o r e 
than 10 is considered inplausible, the risk m o d e l b a s e d on 
the consumption CAPM cannot be a good explanation of the 
abnormal return on value stocks. 
For completeness, we have computed two well known composite 
portfolio performance measures for the glamour and value 
p o r t f o l i o s . The first one is Treynor portfolio m e a s u r e . It 
is a m e a s u r e that can apply to all investors regardless of 
their risk p r e f e r e n c e s . Treynor portfolio measure is 
computed by the formula below : 
Ti = (Ri -Rf)/pi 
where: 
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Ri = the average rate of return for p o r t f o l i o i 
d u r i n g the sample time p e r i o d 
Rf = the average rate of return on a risk free asset 
d u r i n g the same time p e r i o d 
pi = the p o r t f o l i o ' s beta c o e f f i c i e n t d u r i n g that 
p e r i o d 
A larger T value indicate a b e t t e r p o r t f o l i o for an investor 
regardless of his risk p r e f e r e n c e s . T is equal to the risk 
p r e m i u m p e r unit of systematic r i s k . 
The other index is the Sharpe m e a s u r e w h i c h he used to 
m e a s u r e the performance of m u t u a l funds. The Sharpe 
p e r f o r m a n c e m e a s u r e is defined as follows: 
Si = (Ri -Rf) / Gi 
where a± is the standard deviation of the rate of return for 
portfolio i during the sample p e r i o d . It is similar to the 
Treynor measure except that it considers the total risk of 
the portfolio rather than its systematic risk. 
The results are presented in Table 8. A g a i n , we have taken 
the interest rate for 3 months time deposit as the risk free 
37 
i n t e r e s t . For the E/P and B/M s t r a t e g i e s , no m a t t e r w h i c h 
m e a s u r e we u s e d , the risk adjusted p e r f o r m a n c e b e c o m e b e t t e r 
w h e n we m o v e from glamour stocks towards v a l u e s t o c k s . For 
the D/P s t r a t e g y , the trend is not so p e r f e c t . H o w e v e r , 
v a l u e p o r t f o l i o s still beat glamour p o r t f o l i o s b y a w i d e 
m a r g i n . A s we can see, for all three c l a s s i f i c a t i o n schemes, 
the r i s k - a d j u s t e d p e r f o r m a n c e of value stock p o r t f o l i o s is 
m u c h b e t t e r than glamour stocks p o r t f o l i o s . It is true no 
m a t t e r we use systematic risk or total risk in the 
m e a s u r e m e n t . The evidence does not support the risk 
explanation for the m u c h higher returns on value stocks, the 
higher returns seems to be genuine abnormal r e t u r n s . 
38 
Did the Composition of Value Portfolio Change Often ？ 
We have seen that in the sample period from 1980 to 1992, 
value strategies can generate higher risk adjusted returns 
in the H K S E . N o w , a natural question is: how fast is the 
m a r k e t adjusted to eliminate these excess profit on value 
stocks ？ If the compositions of the value stocks changed 
quickly, it means that the market can recognize the high 
return value stocks and eliminate the p r o f i t . Table 9 shows 
the percentage of value stocks which still remain in the 
value group after one quarter, two quarters, three quarters 
and one year. Average across quarters, more than 40% of the 
value stocks are still being undervalued after two quarters. 
There were still 17% of the stocks remain underpriced after 
one year. The results give an impression the market did 
respond, but the response was quite slow. 
On the other hand, we did not consider the effect of 
transaction costs in the computation of quarterly returns. 
One may ask: 、、Will the transaction costs involved in 
rebalancing value portfolios high enough to offset the 
abnormal return on them ？ " Compared with value stocks, 
glamour stocks are mainly blue-chip stocks so the glamour 
portfolios should be relatively stable. In other words, 
glamour strategy should involve less transaction costs than 
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v a l u e s t r a t e g y . In the Hong K o n g Stock E x c h a n g e , the total 
t r a n s a c t i o n costs involved in a b u y - a n d - s e l l t r a n s a c t i o n is 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1%. Suppose the r e b a l a n c i n g of v a l u e 
p o r t f o l i o s in each quarter involve the r e p l a c e m e n t of all 
stocks in the p o r t f o l i o , then we have to deduct 1% from the 
average q u a r t e r l y return we o b t a i n e d to correct for 
t r a n s a c t i o n c o s t s . Recall that for the E/P s t r a t e g y , the 
excess return on value stocks over glamour stocks is about 
7 % . V a l u e stocks are still able to beat glamour stocks b y a 
w i d e m a r g i n after considering transaction c o s t s . 
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Chapter 4: The Performance of the Mutual Fund Industry in 
Hong Kong 
A c c o r d i n g to the semi-strong form EMH, all securities should 
lie on the security market line which relates the expected 
return of securities to an appropriate risk m e a s u r e . In 
other w o r d s , all securities should have the same risk 
adjusted returns and all securities are correctly priced b y 
the m a r k e t . In the last chapter, we have shown that various 
kinds of value strategies can outperform the market b y a 
large margin and the value stock portfolios are not 
fundamentally riskier than glamour stock p o r t f o l i o s . The 
evidence suggests that the semi-strong form EMH does not 
hold in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. In this chapter, we 
are going to study the performance of the mutual fund 
industry in Hong Kong. We want to investigate whether they 
can outperform the market or not. 
Compared with other types of funds, mutual fund data are 
more readily available. So many studies have used mutual 
fund performance in the U . S . to see whether the fund manager 
can beat the market by their expertise. Henriksson (1984) 
evaluated the market timing ability of 116 open-ended mutual 
funds for the period 1968-1980. They reported that mutual 
fund managers were not able to follow an investment strategy 
41 
that s u c c e s s f u l l y times the return on the m a r k e t p o r t f o l i o . 
On the other h a n d , Ippolito (1989) h a d studied 143 funds 
over the p e r i o d 1 9 6 5 - 1 9 8 4 . He found that net of all 
e x p e n s e s , except load charges, m u t u a l funds o u t p e r f o r m e d 
index fund on a risk adjusted b a s i s . He also found that 
m u t u a l funds w i t h higher turnover, fees and expenses earned 
rate of return sufficiently high to offset the h i g h e r 
c h a r g e s . In other w o r d s , their results support the efficient 
trading activities of the fund m a n a g e r s and the e f f i c i e n c y 
of the capital m a r k e t . Lakonishok, Shleifer, V i s h n y (1992) 
studied the structure and p e r f o r m a n c e of the m o n e y 
m a n a g e m e n t i n d u s t r y . Their database is a sample of 769 all 
equity p e n s i o n funds run b y 341 different fund m a n a g e r s . 
They studied the quarterly returns for each equity funds 
from the beginning of 1983 to the end of 1989. The returns 
on the equity funds were compared with the S & P 500. They 
reported that on average, the equity portion of a 
representative fund had underperformed the S & P 500 b y 1.3% 
per y e a r . Their results did not net out fees for active 
m a n a g e m e n t . If this had been taken into account, the net 
income of the funds would be even smaller. They also found 
that for the pension fund industry as a whole, the 
performance of the funds over time was not consistent. 
42 
H o w e v e r , the p r e v i o u s studies d e s c r i b e d e m p l o y e d the trace 
b a c k w a r d m e t h o d o l o g y . Those funds that could n o t survive 
w e r e e x c l u d e d from the s a m p l e . This feature i n t r o d u c e d a 
sample s e l e c t i o n bias into the r e s u l t s . The studies have 
o v e r e s t i m a t e d the p e r f o r m a n c e of the funds b y including only 
the m o s t successful subset in the s a m p l e . M a l k i e l (1995) 
u s e d an unique dataset which is free of survival bias to 
examine the p e r f o r m a n c e of the m u t u a l fund i n d u s t r y . He 
e m p l o y e d a chase forward m e t h o d o l o g y . His dataset consist of 
returns on all m u t u a l funds existing each year in the p e r i o d 
1 9 7 1 - 1 9 9 1 . W h e n returns from all funds were considered, he 
found that m u t u a l funds tend to underperform the m a r k e t even 
b e f o r e the deduction of m a n a g e m e n t fees. He also failed to 
find any evidence to support the claim that the performance 
of m u t u a l fund managers are p e r s i s t e n t . M a l k i e l concluded 
that active m a n a g e m e n t generally failed to provide excess 
return and m o s t investors would be better off purchasing a 
low expense index fund. 
Compared with the U . S., the mutual fund profession in Hong 
Kong has a much shorter h i s t o r y . Before 1983, there is only 
one such equity fund in Hong K o n g . Based on the mutual fund 
data, we can examine the performance of the mutual fund in 
two approaches. In the first treatment, we use a longer 
sample period with a smaller number of funds. Our sample 
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p e r i o d starts from M a r c h 1983 to D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 2 . For v a l i d 
c o m p a r i s o n , we consider only equity funds w h i c h invest 
e x c l u s i v e l y in the stocks in the H K S E . There are five such 
funds in the sample, n a m e l y JF Hong K o n g , B a r i n g IUF H o n g 
K o n g , Finistere Hong Kong Life, Gartmore H o n g Kong and 
S c h r o d e r A s i a Hong K o n g . The returns data of the m u t u a l 
funds are extracted from Micropal• Table 10 p r e s e n t s the 
average q u a r t e r l y returns of the m u t u a l funds, together w i t h 
their standard deviation and CAPM b e t a . R(X,I) is the 
c o r r e l a t i o n coefficient between the returns of a fund and 
the Hang Seng Index. The corresponding data of the value-
w e i g h e d m a r k e t portfolio are also p r e s e n t e d . 
In terms of average quarterly returns, 2 out of 5 m u t u a l 
funds, n a m e l y , JF Hong Kong and Schroder Asia Hong Kong, 
b e a t the m a r k e t . The remaining three funds generate a lower 
average quarterly return than the market p o r t f o l i o . A l s o , we 
can see that the returns of all funds have very high 
correlation coefficient with the Hang Seng Index. This 
suggests that the mutual funds concentrate their investment 
on the index stocks. Next, we consider the average 
performance of the mutual funds. Suppose we form an equally 
weighed portfolio with the same dollar investment in the 
five funds (we call the portfolio 、、equal fund"), the 
performance of this portfolio is shown in the last column of 
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T a b l e 1 0 . On a v e r a g e , the equal fund p o r t f o l i o have a 
q u a r t e r l y r e t u r n of 6.69% c o m p a r e d w i t h the 6.88% q u a r t e r l y 
r e t u r n of the m a r k e t p o r t f o l i o . The s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n and 
C A P M b e t a of the fund p o r t f o l i o s are 0.161 and 1.013 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . The standard deviation of the m a r k e t p o r t f o l i o 
is 0 . 1 5 6 . That is, w i t h a higher standard d e v i a t i o n than the 
m a r k e t p o r t f o l i o and a beta w h i c h is larger than 1, the 
、、funds p o r t f o l i o " generated a return lower than the m a r k e t . 
M o r e o v e r , the correlation coefficient b e t w e e n the returns of 
the ''funds p o r t f o l i o " and the Hang Seng Index is extremely 
h i g h (0.972). It again suggests that in general, the fund 
m a n a g e r s concentrate in buying the index s t o c k s . 
It should be noted that, in the comparison, we have 
o v e r e s t i m a t e d the performance of the mutual funds because we 
use a chase b a c k w a r d a p p r o a c h . We only consider the funds 
that exists in 1983 and still exist in 1992. We have exclude 
those funds which were present in 1983 but have disappeared 
b e f o r e 1992. Thus, our results suffer from a survival b i a s . 
We have overestimated the performance of the mutual funds b y 
considering only a subset of the funds which are most 
s u c c e s s f u l . The result is clear, in our sample period, 
equity funds in the HKSE cannot beat a simple buy-and-hold 
strategy. M o r e o v e r , it seems that fund managers concentrate 
in the trading of blue-chip stocks. They m a y not be trying 
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to p i c k up p r o m i s i n g stocks w h i c h are u n d e r v a l u e d b y the 
m a r k e t . T h u s , m u t u a l funds only serve the function of 
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n for small investors who cannot d i v e r s i f y b y 
h i m s e l f b e c a u s e of his small capital b a s e . 
For c o m p l e t e n e s s , we also p r e s e n t the p e r f o r m a n c e of the 
p o r t f o l i o s w h i c h use E/P to sort stocks in the same p e r i o d 
(June 1983 - December 1992). Table 11 shows the average 
r e t u r n s , s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n s , CAPM betas and the correlation 
c o e f f i c i e n t s w i t h the index [R(X,I)] for different 
p o r t f o l i o s . Similar to the results we p r e s e n t e d in the last 
c h a p t e r , value stock portfolios generate a m u c h higher 
average return than glamour stock p o r t f o l i o s . M o r e o v e r , it 
can be shown that the small difference in betas cannot 
explain the large return difference between glamour stocks 
and value s t o c k s . It is interesting to note that value stock 
p o r t f o l i o s , w h i c h have the highest average return, have the 
lowest correlation coefficient with the Hang Seng Index. 
A n alternative approach concentrates on a shorter sample 
p e r i o d w i t h a larger number of equity funds. The sample 
p e r i o d starts from the second quarter of 1988 to the end of 
1992. There are altogether 17 funds in the sample. Table 12 
presents the quarter by quarter returns of an equally-
w e i g h e d funds portfolio, the returns of the median fund 
46 
c o m p a r e d w i t h the returns of the m a r k e t p o r t f o l i o . The 
e q u a l l y - w e i g h e d funds p o r t f o l i o generate an average 
q u a r t e r l y return slightly higher than the m a r k e t p o r t f o l i o . 
H o w e v e r , the t - s t a t i s t i c s is only 0.708, w h i c h m e a n s that 
the d i f f e r e n c e is not s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . For the 
n o n - p a r a m e t r i c W i l c o x o n Test, the Z - s t a t i s t i c s is 1.5292, 
w h i c h is also not significant at 95% confident i n t e r v a l . Out 
of 17 q u a r t e r s , the m e d i a n fund o u t p e r f o r m e d the m a r k e t in 
13 q u a r t e r s . On average, there are less than 10 funds which 
can b e a t the m a r k e t in each q u a r t e r . The standard deviation 
of the equal fund portfolio is 0.140, which is slightly 
larger than the standard deviation of the m a r k e t p o r t f o l i o . 
The CAPM beta of the fund portfolio is close to one (0.99). 
It seems that on average the mutual fund industry performs 
s l i g h t l y b e t t e r than the m a r k e t . However, the difference is 
not s i g n i f i c a n t . M o r e o v e r , the survival bias present in the 
sample tends to overestimate the performance of the mutual 
f u n d . So, a reasonable conclusion is that m u t u a l fund on 
average cannot significantly and consistently beat the 
m a r k e t . 
In fact, the results here parallel the findings obtained 
from previous studies. That is, fund managers on average 
cannot beat a simple buy-and hold-strategy. The fund returns 
is m o r e or less the same compared with the return on the 
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m a r k e t p o r t f o l i o . M o r e o v e r , the h i g h c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t 
b e t w e e n the funds return and the return on H a n g Seng Index 
s u g g e s t s that the funds m a y be trading h e a v i l y on the blue-
c h i p s . U n l i k e in the U . S . , m u t u a l funds in H o n g K o n g are not 
o b l i g e d to d i s c l o s e the composition of their p o r t f o l i o s . We 
can o n l y h a v e information about the relative p o r t p o r t i o n of 
i n v e s t m e n t in d i f f e r e n t sectors or i n d u s t r i e s . Since we do 
n o t know w h i c h stocks the fund m a n a g e r s invested in, we 
cannot o b t a i n direct evidence to show that fund m a n a g e r s 
c o n c e n t r a t e d their trading on index stocks o n l y . 
On the other h a n d , we have p r o v e d that simple value 
s t r a t e g i e s can generate higher risk-adjusted r e t u r n s . We can 
p r e d i c t cross section price return difference b y analyzing 
simple accounting multiples such as E/P, B/M and D / P . We 
c o n j e c t u r e that for most of the fund, they cannot outperform 
the m a r k e t because they concentrate too much on the trading 
of b l u e - c h i p s . These blue-chips are likely to be glamour 
s t o c k s . The fund managers m a y have ignored those less 
p o p u l a r value stocks. As a result, they over-invested in 
glamour stocks and under-invested in value stocks. If this 
is the case, it is not surprising to find that they cannot 
b e a t the m a r k e t . 
48 
Chapter 5 : SummarY and Interpretation of the Findings: 
The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the cross-sectional stock price 
returns and certain financial variables has attracted 
c o n s i d e r a b l e research attention from scholars and investment 
p r o f e s s i o n a l s in the U . S . On the contrary, there is little 
research in this area for the stock markets in the Pacific 
Basin r e g i o n . In order to shed more light on the robustness 
of these relationships, this study relates the cross-
sectional differences in stock price returns on Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange to the behaviour of three fundamental 
variables: earnings to market equity, book value to market 
equity and dividend to price ratios. In addition, we have 
also investigated the performance of the mutual fund 
industry in Hong Kong. The findings in this study can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. In the period from March 1980 to December 1992, a variety 
of simple contrarian strategies which involve the buying 
of value stocks have outperformed glamour strategies and 
the m a r k e t . For example, if we employ the E/P strategy, 
the average quarterly return of value stocks is 13.54%, 
which is substantially larger than the 6.39% quarterly 
return on glamour stocks. 
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2 . U s i n g d i f f e r e n t m e a s u r e m e n t to fundamental risk, we found 
no s u p p o r t for the risk b a s e d m o d e l w h i c h says that value 
s t o c k s h o u l d be riskier than glamour s t o c k s . In 
p a r t i c u l a r , value p o r t f o l i o s s i g n i f i c a n t l y o u t p e r f o r m 
g l a m o u r p o r t f o l i o s in the 、、bad" quarters in w h i c h the 
m a r g i n a l u t i l i t y of w e a l t h is extremely h i g h . This m e a n s 
that v a l u e stocks lose less in b a d times and w i l l not 
expose investors to a larger downside r i s k . Other 
t r a d i t i o n a l m e a s u r e s of risk such as CAPM beta and 
s t a n d a r d deviation also cannot explain the substantial 
a b n o r m a l returns generated by investing in value s t o c k s . 
A l t h o u g h some scholars argue that value stocks which earn 
h i g h e r returns m u s t b y definition be fundamentally 
r i s k i e r , the weight of evidence supports the more 
straight explanation that the market prices were not 
e f f i c i e n t . Investors m a y overreact to recent information, 
they o v e r - b u y glamour stocks and over-sell value stocks. 
Thus, the out-of-favour value stocks have been 
c o n s i s t e n t l y underpriced, and investing in them can earn 
abnormal risk adjusted returns. 
3 . Finally, we found that on average, the equity fund 
industry in Hong Kong cannot outperform the m a r k e t . 
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T h u s , w e h a v e p r o v e d that the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n stock 
r e t u r n s and certain variables e s t a b l i s h e d in U . S . also 
e x i s t s in the H o n g Kong Stock E x c h a n g e . We have c o n f i r m e d 
that such r e l a t i o n s h i p is not limited to the U . S . stock 
m a r k e t . Such p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of stock p r i c e returns reflects 
m a r k e t i n e f f i c i e n c y . If the investors are aware of the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p , they should use it to exploit the abnormal 
r e t u r n s , then the excess return on value stocks over glamour 
stocks could not p e r s i s t for so l o n g . 
The o b s e r v e d p e r s i s t e n t superior performance of value stocks 
can be e x p l a i n e d by the conj ecture given b y Lakonishok, 
S h l e i f e r and V i s h n y (1994). Both individual and 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l investors have been actively avoiding 
i n v e s t m e n t in value stocks. For individual investors, there 
are several possible reasons for them to prefer glamour 
stocks over value stocks. First, individual investors are 
not able to conduct research about stock price returns. 
Since they know little about the out-of-favour value stocks, 
the overall degree of confidence built up at the blue-chip 
level is m u c h h i g h e r . Consequently, they will just focus on 
the well known glamour stocks. Second, they m a y think that 
h o l d i n g the stocks of a well-known firm is good investment, 
regardless of the stock p r i c e . More importantly, we have 
p r o v e d that a portfolio of value stocks is not fundamentally 
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r i s k i e r than a p o r t f o l i o of glamour s t o c k s . If one invests 
in a single v a l u e stock, it can be v e r y r i s k y . So, for an 
o r d i n a r y i n v e s t o r who does not have enough capital to 
d i v e r s i f y his i n v e s t m e n t , investing in glamour stocks m a y be 
a m o r e p r u d e n t i n v e s t m e n t . 
On the other h a n d , institutional investors should have 
e n o u g h r e s o u r c e s and expertise to conduct extensive research 
on the c a p i t a l m a r k e t . They should not have the expectation 
errors of the individual i n v e s t o r s . They should recognize 
the superior p e r f o r m a n c e of value strategies and engage in 
it to exploit the excess r e t u r n s . In fact, institutional 
investors also have their own reasons for their preference 
of glamour stocks over value stocks. First, glamour stocks 
of w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d firms are not likely to have any 
financial p r o b l e m in the near future. They can justify 
sponsors e a s i l y . On the other hand, sponsors m a y resist the 
o u t - o f - f a v o u r value stocks because they know little about 
t h e m . M o r e o v e r , it is usual for the funds to skip small or 
the unpopular stocks because their massive size would 
a d v e r s e l y affect market p r i c e . In fact, there is evidence to 
support that the trading of institutions do affect stock 
prices significantly. 
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S e c o n d , it is a common p r a c t i c e to evaluate the p e r f o r m a n c e 
of a fund w i t h respect to a b e n c h m a r k . For e x a m p l e , it is 
n a t u r a l to compare the returns on an HK equity fund w i t h the 
returns on the Hang Seng Index. In order to avoid 
u n d e r p e r f o r m i n g the index, fund m a n a g e r s m a y tie their 
i n v e s t m e n t p o r t f o l i o closely to the index s t o c k s . B e c a u s e of 
this a g e n c y p r o b l e m , m o s t of the fund m a n a g e r w i l l m i n i m i z e 
their own downside risk b y concentrating their investment on 
the b l u e - c h i p s . If most of the large players in the m a r k e t 
chase the index stocks, then the index stocks will certainly 
be o v e r p r i c e d . 
In the last chapter, we have shown that equity fund m a n a g e r s 
on average cannot beat the m a r k e t . Evidence also suggest 
that they have been heavily investing in the b l u e - c h i p s . The 
findings are consistent with the conjecture given a b o v e . 
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Appendix: 
Table 1: Average Quarterly and Annual Returns for the E/P Portfolios 
Glamour Value 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
A Q R ( % ) ^ T U ^ 1 ^ U M 7.71 
A Y R ( % ) 25.36 29.38 35.37 45.51 63.71 31.58 
Table 2: Average Quarterly and Annual Returns for the BfM Portfolios 
Glamour Value 
1 2 3 4 5 
A Q R ( % ) ^ ^ ^ i 0 ^ 12.96~~~ 
A Y R ( % ) 24.92 27.30 35.30 47.62 58.99 
Table 3: Average Quarterly and Annual Returns for the D/P Portfolios 
Glamour Value 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
A Q R ( % ) ^ T % SA5 ^ 11.43 9.68 
A Y R ( % ) 35.14 31.24 35.76 43.29 52.31 40.18 
Table 4: The Performance of Value Stocks relative to Glamour Stocks for all Three Strategies 
“ Y e a r and Month E/P Strategy B/M Strategy D/P S t ra tegy~ 
V-G (%) V-G (。/o) V-G (%) 
198003 5.2 14.1 -1.8 
198006 6.3 1.7 -3.3 
198009 -14.5 32.6 -10.3 
198100 -0.5 13.3 13.9 
198103 7.2 -6.2 -13.7 
198106 29.1 28.7 30.9 
198109 -2.1 -5 -10.3 
198200 8.8 3.6 9.4 
198203 7.2 14.6 7.5 
198206 -1 0.5 7.7 
198209 14.9 -16.4 8.2 
198300 9.1 -18.8 0.4 
198303 -1.9 -0.4 11.9 
198306 0.9 2.4 14.2 
198309 13.4 -5.1 5.4 
198400 11.2 5.1 13.2 
198403 9.4 6.4 11.5 
198406 10.1 3.4 15.3 
198409 43.8 7.2 -37 
198500 -23.5 -1.4 -13.7 
198503 11 7.8 10 
198506 -2.2 -6.7 3.6 
198509 8.3 3.5 -15.1 
198600 13.4 0.4 10.1 
198603 -1.4 17.4 -27.2 
198606 17.5 18.2 15.2 
198609 37 42.5 0.3 
198700 -0.8 11 0.8 
198703 9.5 4.2 7.4 
198706 34.4 48.7 10.2 
198709 9.9 6 18.6 
198800 7.6 -2.1 -2.8 
198803 18 23.3 16.7 
198806 1.7 8.2 7.1 
198809 2.5 10.2 -2.2 
198900 7.3 12.9 2.1 
198903 7.3 -3.8 7 
198906 1.9 23.2 -7.3 
198909 0.7 -3 -4.2 
199000 10.1 2.5 7.1 
199003 -5.5 6.4 8.3 
199006 6.4 10.4 8.9 
199009 2.4 2.1 1.6 
199100 11.3 4.6 12.1 
199103 4.7 3.4 12.6 
199106 8.8 3.8 0.8 
199109 1.1 -1.7 1 
199200 -1.2 -0.5 0.5 
199203 4.1 8.4 -10.2 
199206 0.7 -1.5 -1.8 
199209 5 4.9 5.6 
Table 5: Performance ofPortfolios Across Best and Worst GDP Growth Quarters 
Panel 1 “ 
E/P strategy Glamour(%) Value(%) YOY GDP Growth V-G(%) t-statistics 
W 
Bad 7.09 14.43 0.118 7.34 3.71 
Average 2.59 7.92 6.369 5.34 2.64 
Good 17.96 30.72 14.01 12.86 3.02 
Panel 2 
BM strategy Glamour(%) Value(%) YOY GDP Growth V-G(%) t-statistics 
(%) 
Bad 9.70 10.10 0.118 0.40 0.09 
Average 1.47 7.55 6.369 6.08 3.77 
Good 18.14 32.83 14.01 14.69 2.64 
Panel 3 — 
D/P strategy Glamour(%) Value(%) YOY GDP Growth V-G(%) t-statistics 
(o/o) 
Bad 9.34 13.28 0.118 3.94 1.86 
Average 4.54 6.97 6.369 2.43 1.00 
Good 19.74 24.06 14.01 4.32 1.63 
Table 6: Performance ofPortfolios Across Best and Worst Stock Market Quarters 
Panel 1 “ “ 
E/P strategy Glamour(%) Value(%) Market(%) V-G(%) t-statistics 
Bad -24.63 -16.08 -21.8 8.56 2.78 
Average 7.51 13.49 8.77 5.98 3.40 
Good 36.53 47.08 28.4 10.55 1.74 
Panel 2 ~ 
BM strategy Glamour(%) Value(%) Market(%) V-G(%) t-statistics 
Bad -22.96 -19.63 -21.8 3.33 0.82 
Average 8.18 13.20 8.77 5.02 4.16 
Good 30.53 48.59 28.4 18.06 2.18 
Panel 3 ~~ 
D/P strategy Glamour(%) Value(%) Market(%) V-G(%) t-statistics 
Bad -24.27 -12.81 -21.8 11.54 3.76 
Average 9.88 12.39 8.77 2.51 1.23 
Good 38.66 34.61 28.4 -4.05 1.47 
Table 7: Traditional Measures ofRisk for Portfolios 
Panel 1 “ “ 
E/P Strategy Glamour Value 
1 2 3 4 5 
Stand. Dev. (a) 0.2181 0.2203 0.1994 0.2140 0.2485 
CV 3.4125 2.8400 2.2991 2.1135 1.8351 
P 1.1359 1.1171 1.0754 1.1131 1.2022 
Panel 2 ~ ~ 
BM Strategy Glamour Value 
1 2 3 4 5 
Stand. Dev. (a) 0.1957 0.2111 0.2084 0.2309 0.2581 
CV 3.1612 3.0504 2.5210 2.181 1.9920 
p 1.0706 1.1308 1.1131 1.1834 1.2547 
Panel 3 — 
D/P Strategy Glamour Value 
1 2 3 4 5 
Stand. Dev. (a) 0.2289 0.2130 0.2088 0.2278 0.1862 
CV 2.7347 2.7653 2.4711 2.3006 1.6291 
p 1.2215 1.1724 1.1413 1.1583 0.9064 
Table 8: Composite Performance Measures for Portfolios 
Panel 1 “ “ 
E/P Strategy Glamour Value 
1 2 3 4 5 
Ti 3 . 9 8 4 . 7 0 6 . 3 2 7 . 4 1 9 . 7 1 
Si 0 . 2 0 7 0 . 2 3 8 0 . 3 4 1 0 . 3 8 6 0 . 4 7 0 
Panel 2 “ 
BM Strategy Glamour Value 
1 2 3 4 5 
Ti 4 . 0 3 4 . 4 7 5 .75 7 . 3 6 8 .84 
Si 0 . 2 2 1 0 . 2 4 0 0 . 3 0 7 0 . 3 7 7 0 . 4 3 0 
Panel 3 ‘ 
D/P Strategy Glamour Value 
1 2 3 4 5 
Ti 5 . 3 2 4 . 9 7 5 . 7 7 6 .93 10.55 
Si 0 . 2 8 4 0 . 2 7 4 0 . 3 1 5 1 0 . 3 5 2 5 0 . 5 1 3 4 
Table 9: Change in the Composition of Value Portfolio Between Quarters 
Value in: % Remained in Value Stocks 
After One Quarter After Two Quarters After Three Quarters After One Year 
198003 80.00 50.00 40.00 20.00 
198006 57.14 42.86 14.29 14.29 
198009 53.85 15.38 15.38 15.38 
198100 62.50 33.33 20.83 12.50 
198103 54.17 33.33 20.83 12.50 
198106 50.00 30.77 15.38 15.38 
198109 50.00 27.27 22.73 18.18 
198200 60.87 34.78 21.74 13.04 
198203 61.90 38.10 23.81 9.52 
198206 65.00 50.00 20.00 15.00 
198209 66.67 27.78 16.67 16.67 
198300 45.00 20.00 20.00 15.00 
198303 57.89 36.84 26.32 15.79 
198306 64.71 52.94 23.53 11J6 
198309 62.50 25.00 12.50 12.50 
198400 36.84 26.32 21.05 5.26 
198403 61.11 50.00 33.33 16.67 
198406 76.47 41.18 23.53 23.53 
198409 44.44 2778 22.22 16.67 
198500 70.00 40.00 30.00 15.00 
198503 61.90 38.10 14.29 4.76 
198506 65.00 30.00 5.00 5.00 
198509 45.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
198600 52.38 47.62 33.33 14.29 
198603 86.96 69.57 17.39 13.04 
198606 80.00 23.33 16.67 16.67 
198609 51.72 24.14 20.69 17.24 
198700 48.57 42.86 28.57 14.29 
198703 71.43 45.71 31.43 14.29 
198706 56.76 40.54 24.32 18.92 
198709 52.78 33.33 25.00 22.22 
198800 62.50 47.50 42.50 25.00 
198803 78.05 70.73 48.78 24.39 
198806 78.57 54.76 26.19 19.05 
198809 68.29 26.83 19.51 12.20 
198900 46.81 36.17 25.53 10.64 
198903 69.57 45.65 30.43 13.04 
198906 68.09 44.68 25.53 10.64 
198909 65.22 39.13 23.91 15.22 
199000 61.70 42.55 34.04 17 02 
199003 75.00 62.50 41.67 22 92 
199006 82.22 55.56 33.33 26.67 
199009 70.45 40.91 36.36 34.09 
199100 59.57 46.81 44.68 29 79 
199103 80.43 71.74 36.96 34 78 
199106 84.78 43.48 36.96 28.26 
199109 52.00 42.00 34.00 34.00 
199200 59.57 46.81 40.43 
199203 71.19 59.32 
199206 75.86 
" ^ ^ ^ " " ^ ^ " " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ " - ^ ^ " " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ * ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ * i B ^ ^ ^ ^ B B ^ ^ ^ ^ B B ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ M ^ ^ ^ ^ B ^ ^ ^ M I i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ M I M I ^ H * ^ ^ B ^ ^ B ^ 
Mean 63.27 40.53 26.08 17.09 
Table 10: The Performanee o fHK Equity Funds in March 1983 - December 1992 
Market JF Hong Baring Finistere Gartmore Schroder Equal 
Kong IUF HK HK Life HK Asia HK Fund 
AQR o/o) ^ ^ WA ^ ^ ~ ~ ^ 6.69 
AYR(%) 32.24 28.42 36.12 28.42 28.76 32.14 30.75 
a 0.156 0.170 0.187 0.165 0.152 0.154 0.161 
P 1 1.025 1.670 0.958 0.951 0.959 1.013 
R (X, I) 0.921 0.966 0.892 0.976 0.966 0.972 
Table 11: Performance of the Portfolios formed by E/P Strategy 
E/P Strategy Glamour Value 
1 2 3 4 5 
A Q R (%) ^ Tei ^Al r ^ H J 8 
AYR (%) 31.03 35.95 40.33 52.96 73.93 
a 0.213 0.199 0.198 0.219 0.263 
P 1.232 1.220 1.200 1.266 1.434 
R ( X , I ) 0.845 0.922 0.899 0.844 0.793 
Table 12: The Performance ofHK Equity Funds in March 1988 - December 1992 
Percent 
Year Quarter Equally-weighed Return ofthe Value-weighed Funds 
return median fund market return outperforming 
across funds the market 
1988 2 1 ^ fL44 ^ M 
1988 3 -8.61 -7.55 -7.63 9 
1988 4 13.38 12.12 11.02 12 
1989 1 14.79 14.74 14.22 11 
1989 2 -25.05 -25.92 -22.95 5 
1989 3 23.27 24.13 25.39 5 
1989 4 5.15 4.15 1.31 15 
1990 1 6.78 6.85 6.14 10 
1990 2 15.34 14.48 13.72 12 
1990 3 -17.34 -17.07 -16.65 5 
1990 4 9.11 9.47 7.34 10 
1991 1 22.18 22.14 22.75 6 
1991 2 -0.49 0.2 -1.17 12 
1991 3 7.04 7.48 7.99 7 
1991 4 7.69 8.34 7.71 11 
1992 1 17.95 17.62 13.87 16 
1992 2 26.98 26.77 24.80 11 
1992 3 -9.38 -10.08 -10.70 9 
1992 4 -5.18 -4.62 0.72 0 
Mean 
across 6.08 5.67 9.5 
quarters 
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